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13.30 - 13.45 13.45 - 14.00 FERRARO, PAUL J. and R. David Simpson. Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303-3083 (pferraro@gsu.edu); Resources for the Future, 1616 P Street NW, Washington, DC 20036. THE ECONOMICS OF CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS International donors invest billions of dollars to conserve ecosystems in low-income nations. An emerging debate rages among academics and practitioners as to the most effective forms of conservation investment. Among the more popular initiatives to achieve this objective is the use of development interventions in the peripheral areas of endangered ecosystems. Such interventions indirectly provide desirable ecosystem services through two mechanisms: (1) by re-directing labor and capital away from activities that degrade ecosystems (e.g., agricultural intensification); and (2) by encouraging commercial activities that supply ecosystem services as joint products (e.g., ecotourism). We contrast this dominant approach with an approach that pays for ecosystem protection directly. Based on theoretical and empirical analyses, we argue that investments aimed at making payments that are conditional on conservation performance are likely to be far more cost-effective than the currently popular indirect approaches to conservation investment. Although direct payment initiatives have imposing institutional requirements, we argue that all conservation initiatives face similar challenges. An empirical example from Africa illustrates the substantial cost savings that can be realized by direct payment initiatives. 14.00 - 14.15 ORTIZ, EDGAR. Escuela de Ingenieria Forestal, Instituto Tecnologico de Costa Rica, Apartado 159-7050, Cartago, Costa Rica (eortiz@itcr.ac.cr) Program of Payments for Forest Environmental Services in Costa Rica The Payments for Environmental Services Program (PESP) implemented in Costa Rica is an alternative approach to halt environmental degradation derived from deforestation in low income nations. In this system, land owners are contracted for the ecological services they produce when they adopt land uses and forest management activities that do not affect negatively the environment and maintain people's life quality. The Costa Rican program of environmental services aims to protect primary forest, allow secondary forest to flourish, and promote forest plantations to meet industrial demands for lumber and other wood products. These goals are met through site-specific contracts of payments for ecological services with individual farmers. In all cases, participants must present a forest management plan certified by a licensed forester, as well as carry out conservation, reforestation, or sustainable forest management activities (depending on the type of contract) throughout the life of individual contracts. The program was established in 1996, building upon previous experiences in Costa Rica as well as an institutional framework dating back to 1979. The legal basis for the program is Costa Rica's progressive Forest Law 7575, which recognizes four environmental services provided by the forest ecosystems: (i) mitigation of GHG emissions; (ii) hydrological services, (iii) biodiversity conservation; and (iv) provision of scenic beauty for recreation and ecotourism. Budget limitations, and a high offer of forest lands (or a higher demand of payments) have forced the system to look for additional funding through agreements with local and global buyers of forest environmental services. Drawing on Costa Rica’s experience with the implementation of the PESP, the components and technical aspects of a system of direct payments for environmental services are described and analyzed. Advances to date, implementation problems, issues and future steps in the development of the PESP are presented. 14.15 - 14.30 RICE, Richard. Center for Applied Biodiversity Science, Conservation International, 1919 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, d.rice@conservation.org. CONSERVATION CONCESSIONS: A NEW TOOL FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN THE TROPICS. Conservation of biodiversity-rich habitats presents a challenge to nations wishing to develop their natural resources for economic ends. Logging, mining and other resource-development activities offer the prospect of tangible economic benefits but are often environmentally destructive. Although sustainable resource management seeks to provide these benefits while conserving natural ecosystems, experience suggests that a number of obstacles limit both the adoption of sustainable practices and their usefulness in conservation strategies. To address this problem, the Center for Applied Biodiversity Science at Conservation International (CI) has been working in collaboration with Hardner & Gullison Associates, LLC, to develop the concept of a "conservation concession," a novel approach that seeks to directly reconcile resource protection with development. Under a conservation concession agreement, national authorities or local resource users agree to protect natural ecosystems in exchange for a steady stream of structured compensation from conservationists or other investors. The conservation concession thus presents an alternative opportunity for countries to capitalize on vast tracks of forest or other areas of high conservation value. In our presentation we will describe the structure of a conservation concession agreement and our experience to date in implementing concessions in a variety of different contexts around the world. 14.30 - 14.45 MUSTERS, KEES, Hans de Graaf and Wim ter Keurs. Section of Environmental Biology, Institute for Evolutionary and Ecological Sciences, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9516, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands. musters@rulsfb.leidenuniv.nl DIRECT PAYMENT STRATEGIES ON DUTCH FARMLAND Nature on Dutch farmland is under threat from intensive farming practices. The conventional strategy for nature conservation by farmers is to restrict farming intensity and compensate farmers for production losses. An alternative is to pay farmers for nature on their land, as a reward for the nature 'product'. Results of experiments on modern, intensive dairy farms with this scheme are encouraging. Breeding success of meadow birds is significantly higher where farmers are paid for clutches than where they are not (breeding success Lapwing [Vanellus vanellus]: 64.7% on paid farms, 48.2% on non-paid farms; Black-tailed Godwit [Limosa limosa]: 63.1% paid, 39.3% non-paid). The system proves to be less expensive than conservation based on compensating for income losses (paying for clutches costs 40 Euro per clutch, compensating for income losses costs 100-400 Euro per clutch). Farmers are enthusiastic and the system builds cooperation between farmers and conservationists, because they share targets. However, effects on meadow bird populations could not yet be detected. A recent study suggested also low effectiveness of conventional agricultural nature conservation on populations, leading to a debate in Dutch papers. This debate is recapitulated and conclusions for direct payment strategies are drawn. 14.45 - 15.00 Questions 15.30 - 15.45 LOVETT, JON C., Deborah Kirby, Caroline Holmes and Tom van Rensburg. Centre for Ecology Law and Policy, Environment Department, University of York (jl15@york.ac.uk); Agricultural Strategy and Development Group, Central Science Laboratory, Sand Hutton, York; Lincolnshire School of Agriculture, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, LN6 7TS. DIRECT PAYMENTS FOR CONSERVATION IN THE UK: AN EXAMPLE FROM THE NORTH YORK MOORS. Agriculture in the United Kingdom (UK) has undergone a series of shocks in recent years. First the BSE crisis and then a nation-wide foot and mouth disease epidemic. These shocks compounded the problems of an industry with low producer prices and huge subsidy payments through the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The UK government response has been to review the links between farming, the economy and the environment with the release of a major policy document in February 2002 that presses for substantial reform to the CAP and the recommendation that public money should be used for pay for public goods that the public want. If the current system of CAP subsidies based on livestock and crop production are replaced by direct payments for environmental goods and services then this will be a major change in the way that the UK countryside is managed. This paper reviews the economic theory and practice of conservation schemes in the UK. The example of the North York Moors National Park is used to illustrate public perceptions of environmental goods and the economics of sheep farming and grouse shooting. Management agreements developed on 50000 ha of the North York Moors National Park are used to illustrate how conservation objectives can be achieved. 15.45 - 16.00 GICHOHI, HELEN, African Heartlands Program, African Wildlife Foundation, P.O. Box 48177, Nairobi, Kenya, (hgichohi@awfke.org) LAND TRUSTS AND DIRECT PAYMENTS AS MECHANISMS TO SECURE LAND FOR CONSERVATION Many protected areas in Africa are too small to provide the full array of ecological requirements for key wildlife species. Consequently numerous species spend long periods of their annual seasonal cycles on neigbouring private or communal lands, which often serve as dispersal areas and/or critical migration corridors. However, the presence of these animals among poor rural communities often causes severe conflict and imposes costs that these communities can often not afford to bear. Different mechanisms are being tested in an attempt to maintain ecological connectivity and prevent the eventual loss of lands providing critical ecological function. The Tanzania Land Conservation Trust is one such mechanism for securing and managing land for conservation. The first piece of land under the Trust, a corridor linking two protected areas has been secured. A second mechanism, direct payments, is being used to secure a dispersal and corridor area in Kenya. Direct lease payments to willing farmers and pastoralists are "buying the right of way and use’ for wildlife. In my presentation I will describe the challenges and opportunities these two mechanisms provide as alternatives for securing conservation of ecologically important lands. 16.00 - 16.15 Durbin, Joanna C., Aristide Andrianarimisa, Philip J. Decosse, C. Andrew Keck, and A. FRANK A. HAWKINS. Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust, BP 8511, Antananarivo 101, Madagascar (JCD), The Peregrine Fund, BP 4113, Antananarivo 101, Madagascar (AA), International Resources Group, Ltd., 1211 Connecticut Ave, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036 USA (PJD, CAK), Birdlife International, BP 1074, Antananarivo 101, Madagascar (fhawkins@dts.mg) (AFAH). THE POTENTIAL FOR CONSERVATION CONTRACTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN MADAGASCAR The desire to conserve the exceptional biodiversity present in Madagascar's forests has been an important stimulant of the roughly $300 million invested in the environment in the past decade. An assumption has been that local inhabitants around important forests need viable economic alternatives to unsustainable resource consumption. We hypothesize that a more direct link between allocation of resources and realization of conservation would encourage donors to invest and ensure that their investments benefit more directly the poorer rural inhabitants living around forests. We are testing an approach in several ecological contexts where direct conservation payments are calibrated to ensure biodiversity conservation. The proposed conservation contracts, under which resource managers will receive remuneration for biodiversity conservation services, will use existing resource management transfer contract mechanisms. Reinforcement of community-based management is particularly relevant in Madagascar where very little land of biodiversity importance is privately owned. Community organisations would receive most revenues, while a proportion would go to the Ministry of Water and Forests and Communes for their help in establishment of the contracts, compliance and monitoring. Biodiversity indicators would be agreed in advance and subject to independent audit. 16.15 - 16.30 Questions 16.30 - 17.30 Discussion/Debate |